Ausnahmsweise war sich Hillary Rodham Clinton mit ihrem Senatskollegen und republikanischen Präsidentschaftsgegner John McCain einmal einig: Bei bald vier Dollar pro Gallone Sprit müsse der amerikanische Autofahrer entlastet, die bundesweite Benzinsteuer von 18,4 Cents pro Gallone daher für die Hauptreisemonate im Sommer gestrichen werden. Und Obama? Der inzwischen im Kampf um das Präsidentschaftsticket der Demokraten praktisch uneinholbare Senator aus dem Mittleren Westen enttarnt den Vorschlag als das, was er in Wirklichkeit ist: Populismus pur. Und er nennt die falsche Signalstellung und die konkreten negativen Konsequenzen eines solchen Vorhabens beim Namen. DEUTSCHE WELLE
Auf der Suche nach neuen Verbündeten: Neue Führungsmächte als Partner deutscher Klimapolitik
Die wissenschaftliche Beweislage zum Klimawandel ist erdrückend. Erste Auswirkungen sind weltweit spürbar. Dass der Mensch die Hauptschuld an der Klimaveränderung trägt, steht dabei außer Frage. Die Verbrennung fossiler Energien, die Abholzung großer Waldgebiete sowie bestimmte landwirtschaftliche und industrielle Verfahren setzen Emissionen frei, die den natürlichen Treibhauseffekt der Erde immer weiter verstärken. Gelingt es nicht, die großen Volkswirtschaften zu reformieren – und dazu ist in den Worten des Bundesumweltministers nicht weniger nötig als eine „dritte industrielle Revolution“ – drohen im besten Fall unwirtlichere Lebensbedingungen, im schlimmsten eine Katastrophe kaum mehr kontrollierbaren Ausmaßes. Für die Problembekämpfung wird neben den Großemittenten des Nordens das Verhalten einiger zentraler Akteure der südlichen Erdhalbkugel maßgeblich sein: Bekommen China, Indien und Mexiko ihre explosionsartig steigenden Emissionen in den Griff? Wird der Waldschutz in Brasilien und Indonesien seinen notwendigen Beitrag zum globalen Klimaschutz leisten? Können Südafrika und Südkorea ihre fast vollständig auf fossilen Trägern basierende Energiegewinnung reformieren? Und wird die Blockademacht Australien künftig den ihr angemessenen Verantwortungsteil leisten? Die Bundesrepublik hat sich in den letzten Jahren als Lokomotive der internationalen Klimadiplomatie etabliert. Ein klimapolitischer Dialog Deutschlands mit wirtschaftlich und politisch aufstrebenden Staaten des Südens wäre einer Fortsetzung dieser Führungsrolle in einem immer wichtiger werdenden Politikfeld und damit der Profilbildung als Weltordnungspolitik mitgestaltende Mittelmacht äußerst dienlich. Im Erfolgsfall – wenn es also gelingt, neue Nord-Süd-Koalitionen im Klimabereich zu schmieden – könnte ein lang ersehnter Durchbruch in der globalen Klimagovernance gelingen.
BUCHKAPITEL in Günther Maihold/Stefan Mair (Hg.), Kooperation Deutschlands mit Führungsmächten des Südens, SWP/Nomos: September 2008
Wanted: Leadership
President George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol (KP) brought transatlantic differences over climate change to the front pages. Climate change since then has become the symbol of an underlying transatlantic rift with respect to a wider range of global challenges. The disagreement on climate between the traditional partners has been difficult to understand ever since negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) started. It carries dangerous implications for both sides and the globe as a whole. What is needed now is true leadership on both sides of the Atlantic to overcome the divide. Could this momentum be generated, it might set free a positive impetus for other fields of global governance.
Book Chapter, in: Alex Riechel/Aldo Venturelli, Building a Foundation for Transatlantic Climate Policy, Loveno 2005, p. 51-62 (PDF)
Towards a Transatlantic Consensus on Climate Change
With contributions from Fabrizio D’Adda, Kevin Baumert, Corrado Clini, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Michael Grubb, Benito Müller, Friedemann Müller,
Konflikt statt Kooperation? Die transatlantischen Umweltbeziehungen
Alexander Ochs & Marcus Schaper
Mit dem Ausstieg der USA aus dem Kyoto Protokoll gerieten die transatlantischen Differenzen im Umweltbereich in die Schlagzeilen. Klimapolitik wird seither häufig an vorderer Stelle genannt, wenn es um das Auseinanderdriften der traditionellen Partner geht. Dabei sind Meinungsunterschiede zwischen Europa und den USA in der Umweltpolitik alles andere als neu. Viele dieser Konflikte bleiben einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit jedoch verborgen, da sie technische Fragen betreffen und auf der wenig prominent besetzten, administrativen Arbeitsebene ausgetragen werden. Dieses Kapitel bespricht drei neuere Beispiele transatlantischer Umweltpolitik. Der internationale Klimaschutz, Umweltstandards für Exportkreditagenturen sowie die Regulierung Genetisch Veränderter Organismen (genetically modified organisms – GMOs) haben sich allesamt als wichtige und äußerst konfliktträchtige Themen im transatlantischen Verhältnis herausgestellt. Dies ist zuvorderst darauf zurückzuführen, dass es sich bei ihnen nicht mehr um den klassischen Naturschutz der Anfangszeit der Umweltpolitik handelt, sondern um politische Querschnittsaufgaben im Rahmen wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung mit enormem Einfluss auf andere Politikbereiche. Es geht um sensible Kosten-Nutzen-Abschätzungen und Absprachen unterschiedlicher Ressorts der Innen- und Außenpolitik.
Global Governance and Transatlantic Relations in the Issue Area of Climate Change
A transatlantic policy divide has occurred during the last one and a half decades since the Berlin wall came down, the Cold War ended, and there was hope for the pay-off of what was has been called a peace dividend. This hope included widespread optimism that the global society would now be able to focus on new, pressing, non-security challenges which were increasingly global and badly needed worldwide solutions. Seen from today, this hope has not been satisfied. The topic of my presentation here today is “global governance and transatlantic relations in the issue area of climate change”. It is divided in four major blocks: First I will talk about what makes climate change a global governance issue and an issue with great importance for the transatlantic relationship. Then I will briefly explore on where the Atlantic partners lost their joint path and around what the transatlantic differences in the field of climate policy revolve. Thirdly, I will come up with a few theses about why that might have happened, i.e. why the US and
A Century of Climate Protection: How Global Warming Will Change Politics and Economics
I delivered this presentation on 12 March 2008 at the German Embassy,
I.a., my discussion included a climate policy snap shot, a focus on transatlantic disunity, a focus on power shifts in international (climate) relations, the question whether there is a new transatlantic climate looming, and an outlook of the challenges for future climate and energy policy in the search of a post-Kyoto framework.
Nach Nairobi: Wie weiter in der internationalen Klimapolitik?
Europa ist auf der Suche nach einem klimapolitischen Kompass für die nächsten Jahre.
The Climate Changes: Europe Learns to Lead
At their summit last week, the twenty-seven member countries of the European Union agreed on an impressive package of climate policy targets. The union committed to an overall goal of a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Bio-fuels in transport must then account for at least 10 percent, and no less than one fifth of EU energy will have to be generated from renewable sources such as wind, solar, biomass and hydro power. The agreement was quickly praised as “groundbreaking” and “bold” by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, “the most ambitious package ever agreed by any commission or any group of countries on energy security and climate protection” by EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, and as constituting a “new quality of climate policy” and the basis for a “third technological revolution” by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Politicians’ eulogizing of their own efforts is nothing new in politics, not even in the EU which has not exactly been crowned with success in recent years. Still, for a number of reasons the accord might indeed stand as a remarkable milestone in European diplomatic history.
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly? Europe, the United States, and China at the World Climate Conference
The picture drawn by the media of the main protagonists at the UN conference on climate change in Bali was reminiscent of Sergio Leone’s famous spaghetti western. In one corner of the stand-off, a tenacious and uppity Europe, convinced that she will succeed. Then there was America, with her presumptuous plan to either get her own say or obstruct everyone else’s. And finally, China. Recently declared the world’s number one greenhouse gas emitter, she insisted on her right to pollute even more in the future. It was a boring picture, one we have seen all too often in the past. Until the very last day, the Bali summit was only the newest episode in a showdown habitually played out at yearly climate conferences: The European Union tries to provide leadership but cannot do it on its own, while the United States and China remain stuck in their regular gridlock ritual, both unwilling to take responsibility for their share of the problem. This year’s climate conference, however, took a dramatic turn: the script was changed so that, at least this season, the perennial tragedy ended on a positive note. FACET Commentary No. 6
AICGS Event – The Third Industrial Revolution: Energy Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Economic Case for Climate Policy
On December 3, 2007, AICGS was pleased to host AICGS Senior Fellow Alexander Ochs for a lecture titled “The Third Industrial Revolution: Energy Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Economic Case for Climate Policy.” This lecture was made possible by the generous support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
Mr. Ochs began his presentation with an overview of American and European climate policy, including the differing international, national, and sub-national approaches taken by the U.S. and the EU; the difficulties facing the Kyoto Protocol (namely the gridlock between the U.S. and major developing countries); and the main sticking points of transatlantic disunity (including disagreements over the necessity of binding emissions reduction targets and time frames, mechanisms for their implementation, and the inclusiveness of the international regime). He then offered his perspective on the next crucial steps for successfully implementing effective international climate policy. These included the importance of U.S. domestic legislation, the design of a sustainable post-Kyoto framework, a leadership role for the U.S., and the EU’s willingness to continue leadership both at home and in the international sphere.
The challenges of climate change and energy security, Mr. Ochs argued, are intrinsically tied to each other. The climate problem cannot be solved without reforming the energy sector and, likewise, energy security is not possible or affordable with our current energy mismanagement. Thus, we are faced with an ecological problem (increased global temperatures lead to more frequent and intense weather extremes, sea-level rise, and risks to plant, animal and human life); a political problem (overcoming the horizontal and vertical complexities of the world’s “most global” problem); an ethical problem (the poor countries are the most adversely impacted but the rich countries are most responsible for the problem); and an economic-technological challenge (reforming an economy that has been thriving based on fossil fuels for most of the last one and a half centuries since the second industrial revolution).
[Please find a full summary here and the presentation slides here]
The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Norms, Domestic Politics, and Unachievable Commitments
Climate change has been one of the most contentious issues in the transatlantic relationship. The persistent divide escalated when President Bush abandoned the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001. Since then, the EU has emerged as the most fervent leader of this UN-sponsored treaty while the United States has remained the only major developed country, aside from Australia, to oppose it. Why is that? In light of their many similarities, the sources of the rift between Americans and Europeans are puzzling. With The Failures of American and European Climate Policy, Loren Cass provides the most extensive and well-researched comparative study of United States and European Union atmospheric protection to date. In addition to the EU itself, he focuses on Germany and the United Kingdom, its two most- outspoken members on this issue. The book is precisely and eloquently written. It is a valuable contribution to existing literature on the domestic adoption (or rejection) of international norms. Above all, the book is destined to become essential reading for students of these four political actors, all of which will remain crucial for confronting this century’s most pressing global challenge.
BOOK REVIEW, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, November 2007, Vol. 7, No. 4, Pages 149-151